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A CRITIQUE OF THE DIVINE COMMAND THEORY OF ETHICS FROM 

THE TEACHINGS OF THE ABRAHAMIC RELIGION 

Zaria Ibrahim ABUBAKAR 

 

 

Abstract 

Divine command theory is a theory of ethics that grounds the nature of ethical 

demands in the fact that they represent the command of God. It posits that God’s 

command is the ultimate source of moral obligation or that God’s will is the basis 

of moral laws. This position was held by the medieval theologians and 

philosophers like Anselm, Abelard, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. 

Endorsed by Locke and Berkeley, and in the modern age it has been especially 

elaborated by Kierkegaard and Barth, it was criticized by Aquinas, who 

emphasized God’s intellect rather than His will. The divine command theory of 

ethics, however, faces a philosophical difficulty. Interestingly, is that in spite of 

some disagreeing debates within, the divine command theory is supported in all the 

Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). This article, therefore, aims 

to critique the arguments of some scholars for and against the theory. A 

hermeneutic framework is employed. The significance of all critique is that 

looking at morality within the religious tradition, solutions are provided to the 

moral problems within human conflicting societies. 

Keywords: Divine Command, Ethics, Morality, Religion, Ontic. 

 

1.  Introduction 

Divine command theory is a theory of ethics that grounds the nature of ethical 

demands in the fact that they represent the command of God (Blackburn, 

2008:103). Also called theological voluntarism, divine command is a position 

which claims that God’s command is the ultimate source of moral obligation or 

that God’s will is the basis of moral laws. An action is said to be good because it 

conforms to divine commands. An action is said to be bad or evil because it is 

performed even though the agent knows that such an act breaches God’s 

commands. This position was held by the medieval theologians and philosophers 

like Anselm, Abelard, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. It was endorsed by 

Locke and Berkeley, and in the modern age it has been especially elaborated by 

Kierkegaard and Barth. It was criticized by Aquinas, who emphasized God’s 

intellect rather than his will (Bunnin and Yu, 2004). 

However, the social problem confronting the account is that in the period of 

declining religious belief, people fail to attach importance to such moral concern. 

More problematic is that the classical philosophical problem associated with such 

an account is the Euthyphro dilemma: “Does God command that a thing is good 

because it is good, or is a thing good because God commands it?” (Plato, 

1961:169-185). If it is the former, God is not the authority and we should be able 



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to determine our morality without reference to God; if it is the latter, we have a 

tautology: A thing is what God commands because it is what God commands. In 

neither case do we seem to have explained the nature of goodness. This theory has 

difficulty in explaining how God’s command can have moral force. If a moral law 

is justified in terms of God’s will, it is not clear how we can determine that God’s 

will is good. According to this concept of tautology, therefore, if we have other 

grounds for finding out what is morally good, we might determine that God’s will 

is good, but we do not need his commands to know our moral obligations. 

But Graber (1975) argues that divine command theory of ethics has more going for 

it than has been generally acknowledged. He identifies the factor responsible for 

obscuring the merits of a divine command theory as the heavy-handedness with 

which philosophers have been led to deal with it as a result of trying to handle too 

much at once. He shows that it is a mistake to expect any “inherent moral reason” 

for God’s commands. The demand for independent validation of God’s commands 

is based either on an assumption which can be shown to be question-begging, 

given the structure of systems of justification, or on a practical fear which, 

however much it is warranted with regard to human authorities, cannot be 

sustained in the case of divine authority, given God’s benevolence and faithfulness. 

Hence, a divine command theory of ethics can be formulated in a way that is 

consistent and plausible. 

In whichever way we conceive it, we can always ask what the basis of morality 

itself is. There are two quite different explanations that are commonly offered. The 

first is that the basis of morality is social agreement, and the other, that morality is 

ultimately rooted in religion. Our concern, therefore, is to critique the divine 

command theory of morality devised form the perspectives of the Abrahamic 

religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam). 

2. The Critique 

 

2.1 Jewish scholars 

The divine command theory of ethics, faces a philosophical difficulty. The 

difficulty is found in the famous dilemma posed in Plato’s Euthyphro: does God 

freely determine morality, or is morality independent of God? Attempts to trace the 

origins of divine command theory in the history of philosophy often begin with the 

scholastic philosophers John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham (Idziak, 1979). 

Ockham’s moral theory, as noted by Marilyn Adams, is often taken as ‘the 

paradigm of “Divine Command Morality”’ (1986:1-35). According to Idzik, in a 

passage in On the Four Books of the Sentences, Ockham writes: 

...the hatred of God, theft, adultery, and 

actions similar to these according to the 

common law . . . can even be performed 

meritoriously by an earthly pilgrim if they 



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should come under a divine precept, just as 

now the opposite of these in fact fall under 

a divine command. And, with a divine 

command in effect for the contrary of 

these, it is not possible that anyone 

meritoriously or rightly engage in such 

acts, because these are not performed 

meritoriously unless they come under a 

divine command. And if they should be 

done by an earthly pilgrim meritoriously, 

then they would not be called or named 

‘theft’, ‘adultery’, ‘hatred’, etc... And 

therefore, as far as the total meaning or the 

definition of such names is concerned, 

they signify evil qualities…. (Idziak, 

1979:56–57) 

The overall import of this passage is that the moral status of an action depends 

solely upon God’s command. Theft, adultery etc., are wrong at present only 

because ‘the opposite of these in fact fall[s] under a divine command’, that is 

because God forbids these actions. If these actions were commanded by God, they 

would be ‘performed meritoriously’, and, as the end of the quoted passage makes 

clear, they would not be called by names which are negatively morally charged. 

The forms of divine command theory Ockham accepts in this passage is explicitly 

stated, that the actions that he is discussing ‘are not performed meritoriously unless 

they come under a divine command’, in other words God’s command is a 

necessary condition of the moral rightness of an act. But Ockham also says that 

theft, adultery etc., ‘can even be performed meritoriously by a person if they 

should come under a divine precept’, that is, God’s command is a sufficient 

condition of the moral rightness of an act. This denotes that the moral status of an 

action is solely dependent upon the divine command. Ockham thus does not mean 

in this passage merely that God’s command is a necessary and sufficient condition 

of the moral rightness of an action; that would yield only equivalence. 

But Ockham plainly intends, as well, that there is an asymmetrical relationship of 

dependence of the moral rightness of an action on God’s command. And the 

dependence that he argues for in this passage is clearly ontic as opposed to 

epistemic or semantic. In another passage, Ockham writes: 

By the very fact that God wills something, 

it is right for it to be done . . . Hence if 

God were to cause hatred of himself in 

anyone’s will, that is, if he were to be the 

total cause of the act (he is, as it is, its 

partial cause), neither would that man sin 



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nor would God; for God is not under any 

obligation, while man is not (in the case) 

obliged, because the act would not be in 

his own power. (Urban, 1973:312) 

The beginning of this passage, ‘...by the very fact that God wills something, it is 

right for it to be done’, asserts sufficient condition. In the remainder of the passage, 

Ockham claims that there are no moral constraints on God’s actions. Thus, this 

extract also supports morality depends upon God, and He absolutely cannot be 

questioned, because He is not bounded by any moral obligation. Divine freedom 

from moral constraints is also asserted in Ockham’s remark that ‘... obligation does 

not fall on God, since He is not under any obligation to do anything’. However, it 

should be noted that contrasting interpretations of Ockham’s stance are not 

uncommon. Thus even Copleston (1953), who seems to agree that, ultimately, 

Ockham supports divine command theory, believes that ‘we are faced with what 

amounts to two moral theories in Ockham’s philosophy’ because of Ockham’s 

frequent employment of the scholastic concept of ‘right reason’ which he 

sometimes portrays as the norm of morality (Coplestone, 1953:107). Oakley states 

that Ockham is “simply inconsistent” (1961:70). David Clark (1971:72-87) and 

others have all argued that Ockham’s position is significantly more complex than a 

straightforward espousal of ontic divine command theory. 

What is interesting, however, is that in spite of some disagreeing debates within, 

the divine command theory is supported in all the Abrahamic religions. Some 

Jewish scholars, for examples, Immanuel Jakobovits, Isadore Twersky and Marvin 

Fox argue that Jewish tradition supports divine command theory, the notion that 

morality depends upon God’s command. While others like Aharon Lichtenstein, 

Shubert Spero, Louis Jacobs and Avi Sagi object on the ground that tradition 

denies this view. But Harris, M.J. (2003) argues that the picture that emerges from 

Jewish texts is significantly more complex and nuanced than most Jewish 

philosophical literature is prepared to concede on this issue. He shows that the 

contemporary philosophical literature tends to recast Socrates’s query, which is 

‘the Euthyphro dilemma’, in monotheistic and more modern terminology. The 

structures of the dilemma are refashioned in the following way: is it the case that; 

(1) An act is right because God 

commanded (or wanted or willed or 

approved) it, or alternatively, is it the case 

that 

(2) God commanded (or wanted or willed 

or approved) this act because it is right? 

(Sagi and Statman, 1995:11) 



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According to the first structure (1), God, or more precisely His command or will, 

etc., determines morality; morality depends upon God. On the second structure (2), 

by contrast, morality is independent of God; He commands or wills certain things 

because of moral considerations that are not contingent upon Him. 

However, an intriguing response to the issue of divine interaction with morality in 

Jewish tradition is offered by Yeshayahu Leibowitz. According to Harris (2003), 

Leibowitz propounds a highly austere view of Jewish religious life in the following 

statement: 

The religious Jew is he who has accepted 

upon himself the yoke of Torah and the 

commandments . . . if we are talking about 

the religion of Israel, we cannot avoid 

seeing the fact that the original, historical 

Hebrew concept of religiosity is the 

acceptance of the yoke of Torah and the 

commandments. (Harris, 2003:37) 

For Leibowitz, Judaism, at least at the level of the individual religious life of the 

Jew who takes his or her faith seriously, is essentially co-extensive with the 

observance of Torah and the commandments of Judaism. Leibowitz admits that, on 

a more abstract plane, Torah study and observance of the practical commandments 

do not exhaust the entire content of Judaism. But so far as the individual’s Jewish 

life is concerned, he remains adamant that observance of Torah and the 

commandments is the fundamental relevant characteristic. A corollary of this 

picture of what constitutes Jewish religious life is a claim which is highly germane 

to the Euthyphro’s problem, and which Leibowitz (in Harris, 2003) repeatedly 

emphasizes. It is that human needs, interests and values have no legitimate place 

whatsoever in Judaism, as characterized in the following statement; “Judaism is 

not a program for the solution of the problems of humanity but [a program for] the 

service of God.” (Harris, 2003:37). 

Against this background, Leibowitz’s direct pronouncements about the relationship 

between Judaism and ethics come as no surprise, when he writes that: 

Judaism has not been embodied in ethics, 

and there is no meaning to the expression 

‘the ethics of Judaism’ . . . ethics cannot be 

Jewish or non-Jewish, religious or non-

religious -ethics is ethics . . . ethics is an 

atheistic category, which cannot be 

reconciled with religious consciousness or 

religious feeling . . . Scripture does not 

recognise the good and the upright, rather 



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‘the good and the upright in the eyes of the 

Lord’. (Harris, 2003:38) 

This way of de-ethicising Scripture is a technique which Leibowitz is fond of. In 

further attempt to reconcile his insistence that the Torah contains no moral 

directives with the Scriptural words held by Rabbi Akiva who attempts to 

constitute a great principle of Torah, Leibowitz points out that the relevant text, 

‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’ is followed immediately by the words 

‘I am the Lord’  (Harris, 2003:38). This addition, argues Leibowitz, radically 

transforms the verse ‘from a humanistic-moral principle into a religious 

commandment’ (Harris, 2003:37). Leibowitz sees ethics as ‘an atheistic category’. 

Combining this contention with Leibowitz’s treatment of Leviticus 19:18, we are 

again unsurprised by a statement which would otherwise have seemed 

unwarranted; Regarding ‘And you shall love your neighbour as yourself’ . . . as an 

expression of ‘the morality of Judaism’ is merely a heretical falsification of he 

Torah (Harris, 2003:37). 

Leibowitz knows that there exists a category of ethics within the matrix of human 

life. What he is implacably opposed to is the use of Judaism as a means towards 

achieving these human ethical goals. He is also passionately committed to a related 

but even more radical notion: the idea that Judaism even contains any human 

ethics is anathema to him. Judaism and ethics are utterly discrete categories, 

separate realms, and there cannot be any such thing as a ‘morality of Judaism’. 

What this argument necessitates is that we cannot base human morality on religion. 

But this study aims to show that societies have done that and have achieved some 

level of utility in the values and virtues derived from such religious morality. 

In contrast to Leibowitz, Immanuel Jakobovits is an ardent advocate of Jewish 

divine command ethics. He writes: 

Every monotheistic religion embodies . . . 

a definition of moral values... In the 

Jewish view, the human conscience is 

meant to enforce laws, not to make them. 

Right and wrong, good and evil . . . defy 

definition by relation to human intuition . . 

. These values, Judaism teaches, derive 

their validity from the Divine revelation at 

Mount Sinai. (Jakobovits, 1979:119) 

What is moral and what is not says Jakobovits, is, on the Jewish view, revealed to 

us by God. There is no place for the invention by human beings of their own moral 

laws. On the contrary: the task of humanity is simply to submit to the precepts of 

divinely revealed morality. Jakobovits does not consider the possibility of a non-

man-made, objective morality that nevertheless does not depend upon God. He 



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presents only two options, a morality contingent upon God and a subjective human 

morality, and claims that Jewish tradition unequivocally endorses the former. 

Jakobovits’s remarks in the passage cited are brief, and appear in the context of a 

discussion whose primary focus is a topic other than the relationship between 

divine commands and morality. It is thus difficult precisely to determine his 

position, but it is at least clear that he takes morality to be dependent on God’s 

explicit Torah commands, and it would appear that he construes this dependence as 

ontic in nature. In another work, Jakobovits, in a statement reminiscent of one of 

Leibowitz’s observations writes; “...the duty to ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ is 

imperative only because ‘I am the Lord’ - that is, ‘because I have commanded it” 

(1967:292) 

This statement is a definite expression of support for an ontic command form of 

divine command theory. In fact, the concise nature of Jakobovits’s articulations of 

support for the idea that divine command theory is the view of Jewish tradition is 

worth remarking upon, particularly when his statements are contrasted with 

Leibowitz’s remarks. 

Marvin Fox, another advocate of Jewish divine command ethics, makes several 

statements in support of the claim that Jewish tradition endorses various versions 

of divine command theory. In one of his celebrated articles he writes; “It is through 

God’s revelation, mediated by the prophets that men are taught to know what is 

right and wrong” (1972:126). The implication here, certainly in context, is that 

God’s revelation is the only way that human beings achieve moral knowledge. Fox 

thus supports that we would have no moral knowledge without God’s revealed 

Torah commands. The implication becomes explicit in Fox’s next paragraph: 

In ancient Hebrew thought there is only 

one source of the knowledge of good and 

evil - the commandments of God as they 

are revealed to man. (Harris, 2003:38) 

In another essay, Fox expresses unequivocal support for the idea that the Hebrew 

Bible supports both epistemic and ontic forms of divine command theory: 

The Bible knows only God as the source 

of all notions of right and wrong. There is 

no definition of the good except His 

teaching and His will . . . Within the 

biblical framework, He alone teaches us 

what is virtuous; there is no standard other 

than that which He has given us . . . Even 

in the moments of their greatest bitterness 

and despair, the biblical prophets did not 

question that God alone is the source of 



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our knowledge of right and wrong . . . 

without the divine moral standard, there is 

no standard at all. (1990:202-203) 

Fox, however, like most other contemporary Jewish writers who discuss the divine 

command theory, does not distinguish between different forms (e.g. ontic, 

epistemic, and semantic) of these theses. It is possible, therefore, that in this 

passage Fox is merely reiterating support for some version of ontic divine 

command theory. He might just mean to say that what God commands is ipso facto  

moral, and its morality is to be explained in terms of its being a divine command. 

And when he asserts that considering a law as both a divine commandment and 

immoral is a contradiction in terms, what he perhaps intends is the corollary of 

ontic divine command theory that, as we shall see below, is emphasized by Luther 

for the Christian perspective of the divine command theory: if God’s command 

(ontically) determines morality, then logically there can be no conflict between 

divine commands and morality. 

Christian scholars 

The Christian perspective of the divine 

command theory is reflected in certain 

passages in the Reformation writings of 

Luther and Calvin. With their endorsement 

of divine command theory, these figures 

(among others) continued, after Ockham, a 

tradition of adherence to divine command 

theory in Christian thought. In reply to the 

question of why God permitted the fall of 

Adam and why He created all humanity 

God is He for Whose will no cause or 

ground may be laid down as its rule or 

standard; for nothing is on a level with it 

or above it, but it is itself the rule for all 

things. If any rule or standard, or cause or 

ground, existed for it, it could no longer be 

the will of God. What God wills is not 

right because He ought, or was bound, so 

to will; on the contrary, what takes place 

must be right, because He so wills it. 

Causes and grounds are laid down for the 

will of the creature, but not for the will of 

the Creator – unless you set another 

Creator over him! (Idziak, 1979:95) 



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Luther’s language in the third sentence of this citation (‘What God wills’, etc.) 

echoes that of the Euthyphro dilemma as originally formulated by Plato but 

provides (unlike Plato in Euthyphro) a response that favours divine command 

theory. Discussing the question of whether there is injustice on God’s part, Luther 

states: 

For the fact is that there neither is nor can 

be any other reason for his righteousness 

than His will . . . Furthermore, since His 

will is the highest good, why are we not 

glad and willing and eager to see it be 

done, since it cannot possibly be evil? If 

the only reason for God’s righteousness is 

His will, then God’s will is both a 

necessary and a sufficient condition of 

morality. (Harris, 2003:97) 

Luther also conveys the ‘asymmetry’ of divine command theory by making God’s 

will explanatorily prior to His righteousness. Luther then makes explicit a very 

important corollary of divine command theory, which we have encountered above, 

though in a Jewish context:  

...if God’s will (or command) determines 

morality, it follows logically that there can 

be no conflict between His will (or 

command) and morality- ‘it cannot 

possibly be evil’. (Sagi and Statman, 

1995:117)  

The context of Calvin’s passages is a discussion of the doctrine of predestination 

and it also clearly supports divine command theory thus; 

For if His [God’s] will has any cause, 

there must be something antecedent to it, 

and to which it is annexed; this it were 

impious to imagine. The will of God is the 

supreme rule of righteousness, so that 

everything which he wills must be held to 

be righteous by the mere fact of his willing 

it. Therefore, when it is asked why the 

Lord did so, we must answer, because he 

pleased. But if you proceed farther to ask 

why he pleased, you ask for something 

greater and more sublime than the will of 

God, and nothing such can be found. 



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... the will of God is not only free from all 

vice, but is the supreme standard of 

perfection, the law of all laws. But we 

deny that he is bound to give an account of 

his procedure; and we moreover deny that 

we are fit of our own ability to give 

judgment in such a case. (Idziak, 

1979:102) 

Divine command theory is supported in these passages, certainly, at any rate, in the 

first and the third; but there are two further points of interest that make them 

particularly worth critiquing. First, proponents of divine command theory 

sometimes stress human obedience rather than human comprehension. The first 

passage, and even more so, the third, demonstrate the consanguinity that exists, for 

some advocates of divine command theory, between divine command theory and 

an emphasis on human obedience as opposed to human understanding. Second, the 

third passage in particular, makes plain Calvin’s disapproval of human challenges 

to divine justice. We can understand the phrase ‘when justice clearly appears’ to be 

a reference simply to the divine will that Calvin says is the supreme standard of 

justice, not a reference to instances where what God does seems just to us. 

Calvin’s disapproval of human moral challenges to God is echoed in an article by 

James Rachels (1981), who takes such disapproval to be the appropriate religious 

stance. However, Jewish tradition, in Genesis Chapter 18, has tended not to find 

such challenges problematic. Other philosophers who advocate divine command 

theory in the history of philosophy include, among others, Descartes, Locke and 

Berkeley. Another supporter of the theory, though seldom mentioned as such in the 

literature, is John Austin, who writes: “the divine law is the measure or test of . . . 

morality . . . law and morality, in so far as they are what they ought to be, conform 

. . . to the law of God” (Austin, 1998:6). 

Austin holds that there are two kinds of divine commands: explicit (which he terms 

‘revealed’ or ‘express’), and ‘tacit’. Together, these types of commands give us 

(among other things) the content of morality. The way in which we find out what 

the ‘tacit’ commands are, according to Austin, is ‘the principle of utility’: whatever 

action (or, more precisely, class of actions, because Austin is a rule- rather than an 

act-utilitarian) brings about the greatest happiness of the greatest number is tacitly 

commanded. The class of actions that conforms to the principle of utility conforms 

also to God’s command. In Austin’s words: 

the Divine commands [are] the ultimate 

measure or test . . . the principle of utility, 

or the general happiness or good, [is] the 

proximate measure to which our conduct 

should conform, or the proximate test by 



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which our conduct should be tried. 

(Austin, 1998:104) 

The above shows that Austin takes divine commands or divine law as 

explanatorily prior to morality. He says further: “It [utility] is not in itself the 

source or spring of our highest or paramount obligations, but it guides us to the 

source whence these obligations flow” (Austin, 1998:104). 

This passage clearly expresses divine commands, showing them as the source of 

our moral obligations. Austin’s support, as articulated in the above appears to be 

for ontic divine command theory and plus some kind of explanatory priority of 

divine commands over morality. Ludwig Wittgenstein also endorses divine 

command theory, characterising as ‘shallow and rationalistic’ the notion that God 

commands x because x is good (1965: 3–12). Divine command theory has also 

been advanced in various forms by, for example, Robert Adams, Philip Quinn, 

Stephen Clark, Robert Burch, Edward Wierenga and Paul Rooney. All these 

support the thesis that divine command theory can be employed to inspire morality 

of individuals in particular, groups and societies in general. 

 

 

2.2 Islamic Scholars 

About the literature on Islamic divine command, Al-Attar argues that the vast 

majority of the books which deal with “Islamic ethics” or “Muslim ethics” do not 

cover philosophical ethical problems (2010:xix). Donaldson’s Studies in Muslim 

Ethics (1953), as well as Majid Fakhry’s Ethical Theories in Islam (1991), both 

provide the reader with a general knowledge of what is usually referred to as 

Islamic ethics. Yet, neither of them deals in depth with the philosophical ethical 

problems that are related to any society’s socio-political interests. However, this is 

not true as this and similar works influenced by it represent only one trend of 

Islamic ethical thought, those intensely influenced by Greek philosophy. Such 

writers as Miskawayh, although outstanding in general philosophy, should not be 

regarded as representatives of the distinctive aspects of Islamic ethical thought. 

However, regardless of the misconceptions and errors that appeared in 

Donaldson’s book, it was the first to be written on Islamic ethics by a Western 

scholar. Majid Fakhry surveyed major aspects of different ethical trends in Islam. 

George Hourani’s Islamic Rationalism: The Ethics of ‛Abd al-Jabbar (1971) is a 

pioneering work in the study of Mu‛tazilite ethical thought. Hourani rightly points 

out that the writings usually described as ethics by philosophers such as 

Miskawayh and Tusi are mainly concerned with the classification and description 

of vices and virtues in the manner of Aristotle’s treatment in the Nicomachean 

Ethics. He also noticed that theories of values and ethics could be reconstructed 

from the works of the leading philosophers, but that their bases were regularly 

Neo-Platonism, incorporating Aristotelian elements (1971:2). Such books, 



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according to Hourani, “offer little of general philosophical interest that is new” 

(1971:21). Therefore, he considers the Mu’tazila to be the first moralists of Islam. 

He reconstructed a “deontological” moral theory from the works of ‛Abd al-

Jabbār, and provided the reader with valuable insights into Mu’tazilite ethics. But 

his conclusion about the Mu’tazila is erroneous, because as we shall discuss in the 

next chapter, many scholars, like Umaruddin (2003), are of the view that Muslim 

morality is as old as Islam. 

The first indigenous source in Islam is the Qur’an, a scripture believed to be 

revealed by God to the Prophet of Islam. Ethics in Islam, therefore, takes its origin 

from the Qur’an and is wholly based on it. The Qur’an lays down the foundation of 

religious system on purely ethical principles that there is not much to distinguish 

between Islam and Islamic ethics.  Umaruddin (2003:64) argues that the moral, 

civil, canonical and criminal laws of Islam are not rigidly separated from one 

another and cannot be identified as isolated systems. It was the Muslims’ particular 

characteristic that “they took their stand on Qur’an and founded and developed 

their sciences on original and independent lines” (Margoliouth, 1950:55). 

According to Umaruddin, the Qur’an, through divine command, inspired in the 

Muslims the best and the noblest that is conceivable in life. He refers to some 

passages of the Qur’an which he chooses at random thus: 

Shall the reward of good be aught but good Ch 4 

Vs 60. 

And be good to the parents and to the near of kin 

and the orphans and the needy and the 

neighbour, and the companions in a journey and 

the wayfarer and the slave-maids in your 

possession Ch 4 Vs 36. 

And they who, when they spend, are neither 

extravagant nor parsimonious, and (keep) 

between the just means Ch 30 Vs 67. 

And who control their desires... But whoever 

indulge in their desire beyond this are 

transgressors Ch 70 Vs 31. 

And enjoin the right and forbid the wrong, and 

be patient under whatever shall betide thee: for 

this is a burden duty Ch 31 Vs 17. 

And let not ill-will towards any induce you not to 

act uprightly. Act uprightly Ch 5 Vs 82. 

 (Umaruddin, 2003:65-66) 



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The whole of  the Qur’an is full of these kind of divine commands relating to 

kindness, forgiveness, piety, equity, just dealings, compassion, restrain of lust, 

nobility, modesty, and so on. In his book, Ihya’, al-Ghazzali is quoted to have said 

“the Prophet himself says, “I have been sent to perfect morals.” (Umaruddin, 

2003:66). Hashi (2011:124) also writes that “...in the Qur’an, belief in Allah, 

humility, better communications and continuation of good deeds are the 

foundations of good morals.”. He quotes the Qur’anic statements about the best 

person being the person who upholds these moral foundations and invites others to 

practice these values. 

Who can be better in religion than one who 

submits his whole self to Allah, does good, and 

follows the way of Abraham the true in Faith? 

For Allah did take Abraham for a friendCh 4: Vs 

125. 

Who is better in speech than one who calls (men) 

to Allah, works righteousness, and says, I am of 

those who bow in Islam?Ch 41: Vs 33. (Hashi 

(2011:124) 

In Islam, therefore, while the Qur’an lays the foundation of ethical concepts and 

standards, the Sunnah [way of life] of the Prophet contains the actual practices of 

such concepts. And the Qur’an exhorts the Muslims to follow the guidance of the 

Prophet, thus, MacDonald writes that “It is the desire of every pious Muslim to 

model his life in every possible particular upon that of the prophet.” (1960:103). 

Margoliouth also writes that “Every Muslim endeavours to reach the 

unapproachable perfection of the Prophet’s character.” (1950:239). He adds that 

“...the immediate followers of the Prophet who followed in his footsteps are also 

regarded as patterns of good conduct. In contrast to Hourani, therefore these 

immediate followers who are known as the companions of the Prophet were the 

first moralists after him. They possessed all the good qualities, e.g. knowledge, 

understanding, piety, patience, gratitude, etc.” (Margoliouth, 1950:239). 

Despite the fact that the fundamental principles of ethics were present in the 

Qur’an, ethics existed in the form of aphoristic wisdom. It was not studied as a 

philosophical science until the influence of the Greek thought asserted itself on the 

Muslim mind (Umaruddin, 2003:68). And when the Muslims took to studying 

philosophy they mainly concentrated on metaphysics, logic and physical sciences. 

Like the Greeks, at that early stage they considered ethics as part of politics. It was 

Ibn Miskawayh who made an attempt to write a systematic treatise on ethics 

(Sharif, 1966:828).   

 

3. Conclusion 



Abubakar                                                    A Critique of the Divine Command Theory of … 

59 

 

This critique articulates the divine command theory of ethics, showing the theory 

as the source of moral obligations. In addition to the arguments presented by the 

Abrahamic religions, the discussion shows that Austin’s support appears to be for 

ontic divine command theory adding some kind of explanatory priority of divine 

commands over philosophical morality. Ludwig Wittgenstein also endorses divine 

command theory, characterizing as ‘shallow and rationalistic’ the notion that God 

commands x because x is good. Divine command theory has also been advanced in 

various forms by, for example, Robert Adams, Philip Quinn, Stephen Clark, 

Robert Burch, Edward Wierenga and Paul Rooney. All these support the argument 

that divine command theory can be employed to inspire morality of individuals in 

particular, and groups and societies in general. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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